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that must be seen in their interwoven character if seen rightly. A glance at the chapters of this book is sufficient to make clear the point of my criticism; and I am reasonably confident that a careful examination of the book will sustain my judgment.

Professor Baldwin enters upon the proposed study in the third chapter, the first two chapters being an introduction which, I think, is very well done, and in Chapters III., IV., V. and VI. he gives a very good genetic exposition of cognition in its prelogical and quasi logical stages. He discusses the various objects of cognition, the processes by which they are constituted, the interests which impel this construction and the controls to which this construction is subject. He follows out the different lines of progression or advance by which cognition passes from its original to its later stages. Now, having given this psychogenetic account of knowledge, Professor Baldwin proceeds in Chapter VII. to a genetic study of meaning, and in the last two chapters in the same way he gives a genetic exposition of the great dualisms of mind and body, subject and object, with the meanings that are involved in them. The result of this method is that the entire development of knowledge is passed over three times; once in what appears to be a general survey—though the actual study is minute enough—a second time in the genetic study of meaning, and the third time in following out the development of dualisms and lesser distinctions.

Now, I can not see that anything is gained by such a methodology; on the contrary, I think this method is largely responsible for an excessive complexity of details, a lack of simplicity, directness, clearness and thorough system in the handling of the subject-matter.

The other embarrassment I have suffered in reading this book is due to the author's terminology. To be sure, he has kindly provided the reader with a sort of dictionary in one of the introductory chapters; but, even with this aid, I think Professor Baldwin's readers will justly complain of an excess of technical terms, and of terms that compel the reader to be perpetually translating the author's language into his own tongue.

I do not make these criticisms without having at the same time a very great willingness to record my fullest appreciation of a notable book, one that can not fail to add to its author's already splendid reputation, and one which will enlarge not a little our knowledge in a great field of science.

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The Unity of Will: Studies of an Irrationalist. GEORGE AINSLIE HIGHT.
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1906. Pp. xii + 244.

It is a bit hard to know just how to proceed in criticizing the views of an avowed 'irrationalist.' Epistemologically there is next to nothing that can properly be opposed to one who justifies his contention of the primacy of will by intuitive evidence made manifest through 'poetic dreaming.' Those who feel the essential unity of their natures to consist

in a free and unitary will, doubtless feel it and there is an end to it. At most we can make some protest against the distorted psychology which seems to result inevitably from such a view. Yet even here the personal opinion of the observer has a certain conclusive weight in determining at least *his* notions of psychology.

We can, however, utter protest against the universal acceptance of such a voluntarism as belonging to the category of 'truths which, once correctly stated, take their place among the established data of science.' Not that the will may not be as generally acceptable an ultimate as the present status of science can find, but that it certainly is not clearly demonstrated to be the *only one* with which philosophy can make progress. The very maintenance of this dogma by the author shows that despite his avowal he has found it necessary to embrace the rationalistic method in approaching this universal aspect of will. Individual will may be directly evident in my consciousness; universal will certainly is not.

The fundamental fallacy of his contention, it seems to me, rests in the opposition of intellect and will as the only alternatives of metaphysics. Since the concept of being is manifestly transcendental and, as such, can never be adequately expressed in language, why must it, of necessity, be either of these? Philosophy *à la mode* inclines decidedly towards the dynamic rather than the static interpretation. Thus voluntarism in one form or another seems to be 'in the air.' Yet, if we pause in our search for an ultimate *sub specie æternitatis* to consider the relative merits of the dynamic and the static, must we not hesitate before establishing either as necessarily prior to and more fundamental than the other? Is it any easier, I ask, to conceive an action prior to the thing acted upon, than the thing as static, totally at rest?

Even accepting the will as a basis for idealism, is not the step from will to intellect rather vague? And in maintaining a species of realism, as our author does on a voluntaristic basis, is not the breach still further widened? For myself, I am unable to detect the intuitive presence of free will in my own consciousness. Granted that it still be there, I am yet unable to trace the steps of its objective realization in things or its subjective realization in conscious processes other than those which I recognize as volitional in type. The will, an activity, does not appear to be identical with consciousness as a whole nor with the things of the outer world which it is said to motivate and prompt into existence. There seem to be two divergent concepts of will here confused: the will of the self-consciousness, and will as ontological being. This confusion of voluntarism has been clearly pointed out by Kuelpe.¹

I do recognize in my first-hand experience both static and dynamic factors, mutually interwoven and inseparable. The things which I experience are never totally quiescent, neither do I experience activity as such apart from things. I am inclined also to posit the existence of other things in the universe at large as possessed of greater or less degrees of consciousness independent of me, yet all at once dynamic and static.

¹ 'Einleitung in die Philosophie,' 3d ed. 1903. § 27: 13, 14.

But when I turn to the ontological question of a metaphysical essence which shall comprise the being of all these, I can be satisfied with neither voluntaristic, idealistic, energistic nor materialistic formulation. I seem to require something bigger and more all-inclusive than any of these affords. Thus I concur thoroughly with the author's statement: "To assert that the reality of the world is only that which can be seen from one standpoint, or from another, is unphilosophical and untrue, and it is the mistake made by the Ist-ites and party leaders of our day." And yet voluntarist and irrationalist will he be called!

Turning now to some of the more practical consequences of the work, the humanistic tendencies seem highly instructive. The author confesses the 'pragmatic method,' though without so naming it, when he declares "that in things physical the essence of anything is always relative, *i. e.*, directed to some purpose, and changes with that purpose. It is not a stable substance."

The critique of logic as being mainly linguistic and rational is perhaps the ablest part of the book. The author maintains, in brief, that the positive syllogism discovers no truth, and that the principle of subordination is the only one operative in thought processes. The negative syllogism is the critical form of thought and it may, by process of elimination, lead to truth. The only positive syllogisms which promote truth are those which, based on different premises, converge to the same conclusion. A high degree of probability is thus attained. In general, however, the canon of logic that the conclusion is certain provided the premises be true, falls before the doctrine that true premises bring no conclusion at all; they merely assert themselves. Original thought is speechless. Once clothed in words, its originality is gone and it begins to degenerate into dead, mechanical routine. Positive language, except it be for purposes of instruction, expresses not our thoughts, but our sophisms.

The great misunderstanding in the search for a criterion of truth rests in the fact that 'the concept of truth is inseparable from that of language; it is the truth of a verbal subject and predicate.' In strictest sense acts can never be illogical, and the purpose of mental processes is not truth, but action. Definitions in verbal form are always sophistical, since the final definition of a thing is possible only when the science of that thing is complete.

We have, then, for our legitimate activity a verifiable science beginning and ending with observable facts made up (1) of 'inferences verifiable by known facts already established, or at once determinable,' as when science tells us the exact amount of metal contained in a certain ore, etc., and (2) of inferences verifiable 'by some act which it was the purpose of the inference itself to bring forth,' as the inference based on a knowledge of geology that a certain region contains gold. All the rest is unverifiable speculation, only a higher development of sophistry.

The book is written throughout in an attractive and readable style; to this is added the merit of brevity, unusual in philosophic works of this sort. At the end a series of 'First Principles' sums up in concise form

the main views of the author, which, although, as has been pointed out, they do not always fit in with those of one more used to a psychological and epistemological method of approach, still are calculated to present to all much food for profound and beneficial reflection.

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Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence. G. F. ARNOLD, I.C.S. London: W. Thacker & Co. 1906. Pp. 470.

Ever since psychology has attained the rank of a distinct science there have been practical-minded students who have sought to put the methods and results of mind study to good use in the various walks of life. We have become familiar with the psychology of education, the psychology of art, the psychology of advertizing, the psychology of moral improvement and a dozen other applied psychologies. But it is only within the last few years that anybody has striven to apply psychology to that most important social function, the law. Sociologists have, to be sure, viewed the law as a product of certain intricate mental factors; but it was not until several prominent German legalists, headed by Germany's greatest attorney, von Liszt, found themselves confronted with the task of revising the criminal laws of their empire, that the demand for a psychological critique of legal problems became imperious. The difficulties which the Germans encountered in revising the 'Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch' could be solved only by an appeal to the psychologists. An organization of lawyers and psychologists was formed, crucial problems were discussed and, so far as possible, investigated experimentally. Ludwig Stern and his coworkers at the University of Breslau began publishing reports bearing upon moot questions such as accountability, suggestion in cross-examination, memory of different classes of objects and so on. Through these publications the psychological world has already become at least aware of the new 'applied science.'

Mr. Arnold's book, then, will not greatly impress the psychologist. Not only does it appear several years after Stern's 'Beiträge zur Psychologie der Aussage,' but it has nothing new to offer. But, fortunately, the work may be judged by other standards than those of a specialist. In the preface Mr. Arnold makes clear that he is contributing nothing to law alone and likewise nothing to pure psychology. His aim has been solely to induce lawyers to see the relevancy of psychological facts to the legal theories of evidence. Strictly, then, this volume should be reviewed in a law journal.

Nevertheless, Mr. Arnold's presentation of certain crucial points at law will come as a revelation to many theoretical psychologists, convincing them that the legal world, commentaries, lawyers and judges combined, still tarries slumbrously in the high weeds of verbalism and sophistry. Any psychologist who is at the same time a citizen and liable to arrest will feel, after reading Mr. Arnold's volume, that 'something ought to be done about it.' And he will be convinced, with the author, that psychologists have already accomplished enough to make reform possible.